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Defendants (Respondents) do not controvert r1 
' AJ~. 
tiffs' (Appellants) "Statement of Facts" other than:, 
-I" 
the particulars hereinafter specified. Defendants dr:. 
however, deem Plaintiffs' Statement of Facts to be !u. 
complete and inadequate. 
The State lease applications filed by Plaintiffs, her1. 
inafter ref erred to as the ''subject State applications," 
covered all or portions of 27 different so-called "scboo: 
sections'' - i. e. Sections 2, 16, 32, 36 - in 12 different 
townships. Such lands are hereinafter ref erred to as tile 
' 'subject lands.'' Prior to the time the State acquireu 
title to any of the subject lands, 37 United States oil ana 
gas leases had been issued to Defendants under the Min. 
eral Leasing Act of February 25, 1920, as amended (iu 
U. S. C. 181 ff.). Such leases are hereinafter ref erred fo 
as the "subject Federal leases." As appears from the 
Findings of Fact and as will hereinbelow appear, there 
is no common denominator of facts in reference to all ol 
the subject lands or in reference to all of the subjec! 
Federal leases. The several plats of survey coveringthe 
subject lands were approved at various dates. The datei 
of issuance of the several subject Federal leases vary 
(R. 69-86). Other particular facts and circumstance~ 
differ as to particular lands and as to particular subjer! 
Federal leases. 
h • th Find· The pertinent facts are fully set fort m e 
. . I der tha! mgs of Fact of the trial court (R. 27-35). n or 
2 
su<'h ]1,indiugs may be conveniently available for refer-
,,~nce, the complete ]1,indings of Fact of the trial court 
are set forth in the Appendix hereof with inserted and 
italicized references to the Record supporting the several 
partieular findings. 
Plaintiffs offer no objection to or criticism of these 
Findings other than in respect to Finding No. XIII, their 
only comment being (Appl. Br. 13): 
'' In conclusion we respectfully submit that the 
District Court erred in making its Finding of Fact 
No. 13, which stated in substance that the State 
Land Board of Utah has not refused to exercise 
jurisdiction as to those of the subject lands, title 
to which has been acquired by the State." 
Plaintiffs do not undertake to dispute in any respect that 
the State Land Board did those particular things and 
took those particular actions which are referred to in 
Finding XIII. Plaintiffs do contend that what was done 
by the State Land Board represented a refusal on its part 
to "exercise jurisdiction" as to the subject lands. 
In their Statement of Facts, Plaintiffs assert (Appl. 
Br. 3) that: 
" The lessees of the United States Government 
leases requested the five year extension of such 
leases from the United States Government and 
not thP State of Utah after title to the lands had 
passed to the State of Utah (R. 49)." 
As appears from the trial court's Finding X (infra p. a-8) 
and from the record, (R. 85, 77, 86, 92) the just quoted 
3 
statement is correct as to but four (SL-070497, U-0500~-" 
U-05660 and U-05661) of the 37 subject Federal leasrsi·, 
vol ved in this matter. However, even in each of these fo· 
~' 
instances, the Request for Extension was filed with!!, 
Bureau of Land Management long before there had beH 
any decision by the Bureau of Land Management de!tr-
mining that State title had attached to a portion of Iii, 
leased lands and long prior to any notice in this respet1 
to the lessee. 
THE NATURE OF THE ACTION 
Plaintiffs purport to a.sk that the State Land Hoaru 
be required to take over the management and control c: 
the lands described in their Complaint and the leasin1 
thereof (R. 6). 
What Plaintiffs really seek to have decided and dt· 
clared is that the Utah State Land Board must manag~ 
and control the subject lands in a particular manner -
that is, by refusing to recognize the oil and gas leaw 
which Def end ants hold and by issuing oil and gas lease~ 
to Plaintiffs. 
Plaintiffs (Appl. Br. 4) assert that this "action rloe~ 
not try title nor the rights of any of the parties interesteJ 
in the respective leases.'' 
In sharp contrast with that assertion is Plaintiffs 
Point II which reads (Appl. Br. 7): 
f th ropert1 '' The State became the owner o e P h 
when the surveys were made and accepted byte 
Government.'' 
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i ,iki· contradiction is found in Plaintiffs' Complaint 
.,
1 
!wi c in tlic) allege ilia t the lands therein described "be-
came and now are the property of the State of Utah" 
(R. [)) and further allege that the State Land Board "er-
roueously arnl unlawfully deemed said lands to be covered 
)Jy purported extensions of said United States Oil and 
Gas Leases, which extensions were purportedly issued 
and granted ... at a time, or times, when said lands ... 
were owned and possessed in fee simple by the said State 
pf Utah.•; (R. 5-6) 
It is indisputable that Plaintiffs are asking that the 
State Land Board shall be ordered to act upon the prem-
ises that the State acquired title to the subject lands, that 
it arquirecl such title at a particular time (namely when 
the subject lands were surveyed), that such acquisition 
uf title by the State defeated the right of the defendant-
lesseefl to 5-year extensions of their several leases and 
that the recognition of such extensions by the Bureau of 
Land MaHagement and the State Land Board was erro-
neous and unlawful. 
'l'o do what Plaintiffs ask it to do, this Court must: 
l. Determine that a writ of mandate may be used 
to compel the Utah State Land Board to reverse 
the rulings (R. 56-58) by which it acted upon 
an<l rejected Plaintiffs' oil and gas lease appli-
cations (R. fl4-55) and to control the manner in 
which that Board shall exercise its discretion; 
and 
5 
2. Determine whether and when title to the r 
spective sections of land ref erred to !u tu' 
Complaint passed from the United States 
1
,, 
the State of Utah; and 
3. Determine that the Act of April 22, 1954 (~! 
Stat. 57) (commonly ref erred to as the ''Fir~: 
Dawson Act''), amended by the Act of July!!. 
1956 (43 U. S. C. 870) (commonly referredjr, 
as the "Second Dawson Act"), was intended\r1 
amend and operated to amend the provisiom 
of Section 17 (30 U. S. C. 226) of the Minera! 
Leasing Act relating to a 5-year extension 01 
the lease term ; and 
4. Hold that such determinations may be made ii 
an action to which the United States is noh 
party. 
STATEMENT OF POINTS 
A. AS TO ANY SUBJECT LANDS, TITLE TO WHICH 
HAS VESTED IN THE STATE, THE STATI 
ACQUIRED TITLE SUBJECT TO THE THEN OU'f. 
STANDING LEASE OR LEASES ENTERED INTO 
BY THE UNITED STATES AND SUCCEEDED "TD 
THE POSITION OF THE UNITED STATES Al 
LESSOR UNDER SUCH LEASE OR LEASES" AND 
NOT TO ANY OTHER OR DIFFERENT POSITION 
B. THE UNITED STATES IS AN INDISPENSABil 
PARTY TO THIS ACTION. 
(1) Plaintiffs would have this Court requi;' 
n tw the State Land Board to act upo . ·. 
premise that title to certain school sectiori.· 
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passed from the United States to the State 
of fltah at times different than the time 
when the Bureau of Land Management of 
the Department of the Interior held that 
title did pass. 
(2) Plaintiffs would have this Court require 
the State Land Board to act upon the 
premise that title to certain school sections 
passed from the United States to the State 
of Utah at specified times although there 
ha.c; been no determination by the Bureau 
of Land Management as to whether or 
when State title attached. 
( 3) Plaintiffs would have this Court require 
the State Land Board to act upon the 
premise that certain lands are the property 
of the State although the records of the Bu-
reau of Land Management show that title 
thereto could not have passed to the State. 
( 4) The United States had a continuing inter-
est under a Federal lease entered into by it 
as to all lands covered by the lease not-
withstanding the fact that title to a por-
tion of the leased lands paBsed to the State 
subject to such lease. 
C. THE RIGHT OF A DEFENDENT-LESSEE TO A 
5-YEAR EXTENSION OF HIS SUBJECT FEDERAL 
LEASE WAS NOT AFFECTED BY THE FACT THAT 
PRIOR TO THE EXPIRATION OF THE INITIAL 
5-YEAR TERM THE STATE ACQUIRED TITLE TO 
A PORTION OR ALL OF THE LANDS COVERED 
THEREBY. 
D. AN EXTRAORDINARY WRIT MAY NOT BE USED 
TO COMPEL THE UTAH STATE LAND BOARD TO 
REVERSE DECISIONS MADE IN THE EXERCISE 
OF ITS DISCRETION. 
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ARGUMENT 
A. AS TO ANY SUBJECT LANDS, TITLE TO WHICH 
HAS VESTED IN THE ST ATE, THE STATI 
ACQUIRED TITLE SUBJECT TO THE THEN OUT. 
ST ANDING LEASE OR LEASES ENTERED INTO 
BY THE UNITED STATES AND SUCCEEDED "TO 
THE POSITION OF THE UNITED STATES M 
LESSOR UNDER SUCH LEASE OR LEASES" AND 
NOT TO ANY OTHER OR DIFFERENT POSITION. 
As their Point II Plaintiffs make the broad ana 
inaccurate assertion that ''The State became the ow11e1 
of the property when surveys were made and accepted b1 
the Government.'' (Appl. Br. 7) Any particular landf 
which are the subject of this action fall into one of these 
three classes : 
( 1) Those lands as to which the record shows that 
the State never acquired title; 
(2) Those lands as to which there has been no de· 
termination as to whether or when State title 
vested; or 
(3) Those lands as to which the Bureau of Lana 
Management has determined that title veste:l 
in the State. 
In no instance did the Bureau of Land Management 
determine that State title vested when the survey "
81 
made and approved. 
. . I "th th statement Plaintiffs conclude their Pomt I w1 e . 
t 1 became that "By the (Dawson) Act, the State no on Y 
8 
tfie lessor i11 place of the Government, but also became 
owner of said tyroperty." (Appl. Br. 9) Defendants have 
no quarrel with said concluding statement in so far as it 
rdates to the lands which fall within Class 3 as above 
defined. Defendants do take sharp issue with Plaintiffs' 
contention (Appl. Br. 10-11) that the vesting of State title 
operated to defeat the statutory right of a defendant-
lt's.see to a 5-year extension of his lease. 
ln tLcir Point II discussion, Plaintiffs state (Appl. 
Br. 8): 
" Under the stipulation of facts, there is no 
question hut that four of the parcels of land set 
forth in plaintiffs' complaint title passed to the 
State under the Act of July 11, 1956, before any 
application was made for an extension of these 
leases and after the primary five year term had ex-
pired. These leases are U-07312 (R. 82), U-05660 
and U·05661 (R. 86), U-06730 (R. 86A)." 
This statement is incorrect and contrary to the record. 
As to U-07312, the lease was dated September 1, 1952, 
and the Request for Extension was filed June 4, 1957 -
86 days prior to the end of the initial 5-year term on 
August 31, 1957 (R. 82, 158). As to U-06730 (R. 86A), 
the lease was dated May 1, 1952, and the Request for Ex-
teirnion ·was filed April 22, 1957 - 9 days prior to the end 
of the initial 5-year term on April 30, 1957 (R. 86A, 156). 
There has not been in either of these instances any de-
cision holding that State title has attached to any land 
eovered thereby (R. 92). 
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As to U-05660 and U-05661, the respective lea . 
S%11er1 
dated December 1, 1951, and the respective Requ t 1. es s o· 
Extension were filed November 13, 1956 - 17 day · · s prior 
to the end of the initial 5-year term on November 30, rn0~ 
(R. 86, 151). As to U-05660, it was not until May 27 19·0 
I UQ1 
and as to U -05661, it was not until November 6, 1957, thai 
the Bureau of Land Management issued a decision ho!Q. 
ing that State title attached to part of the lands coverea 
(R. 92). 
Background of the Dawson Acts. 
Under the Enabling Act of July 16, 1894 (28 Stat. 
107), Congress granted to the State of Utah in aid ol 
common schools, sections numbered 2, 16, 32 and 36 i11 
each township of the public domain. In the case of Ur1iteri 
States v. Sweet, 245 U. S. 563; 38 S. Ct. 193; 62 L. Eo. 
473, the United States Supreme Court held that the Jana 
grant did not extend to lands which were known to be 
mineral in character at the date title otherwise woulu 
have vested in the State of Utah; that title vested in th1 
State as of January 4, 1896, as to then surveyed landi 
which were not then known to be mineral in character, 
and on the date of acceptance of survey as to lands no! 
known to be mineral in character if the lands were un· 
surveyed at the time Utah was admitted into the Union: 
and also that title would not vest in the State as to Jana 
embraced in any Indian, military or other withdrawal or 
reservation or if rights of third parties had attached to 
the land prior to acceptance of the survey. 
10 
... 
By the Act of .January 25, 1927 ( 44 Stat. 1026 as 
amended, 43 U. R. C. '~870), Congress extended the land 
grants in aid of common schools to : 
''embrace numbered school sections mineral in 
character, unless land has been granted to and/or 
selected by and certified or approved, to any such 
State as indemnity for or in lieu of any land so 
granted by numbered sections.'' 
'fhe 1927 A ct specifically declared that : 
''any lands within the limits of existing reserva-
tions of or by the United States, or specifically re-
served for water power purposes, ... or included 
in any valid application, claim or right initiated 
or held under any of the existing laws of the Unit-
ed States, unless or until such application, claim 
or right is relinquished or cancelled, ... are ex-
cluded from the provisions of this act." (Empha-
sis added.) 
This 1927 statute was adopted nearly 7 years after 
the enactment of the Mineral Leasing Act of February 
25, 1920 (41Stat.437; 30 U.S. C. 181 :ff.). If lands which 
would otherwise become ''school sections'' upon the 
acceptance of the survey plats (2, 16, 32 or 36) were cov-
ered by an outstanding oil and gas lease or other Federal 
mineral lease or prospecting permit or a pending appli-
cation therefor, at the time of acceptance of the survey 
plat, title could not vest in the State until the expiration 
or termination of such lease or permit. If lands so leased 
proved to be productive, the oil and gas or other minerals 
might he extracted from the lands before title passed to 
the State. The effeets of this situation were multiplied by 
11 
delay in government surveys, in consequence of wbiti; 
delay millions of acres in Utah remained unsurveyed. A 
program was ultimately worked out between the Sta!f 
officials and the officials of the United States Department 
of the Interior for survey of township boundaries and ot 
school sections (2, 16, 32 and 36) to accelerate the vesting 
of title to school sections in the State. Even before th!~ 
program of ''skeleton surveys'' was conceived, ma 11y 
thousands of acres of land had been covered by oil and 
gas leases. Consequently, the State of Utah particularly 
was faced with the prospect of acquiring title to mineral 
school sections at some time in the future after the oil 
or other mineral resources may have been substantially 
depleted. 
The ''Dawson Acts'' were directed to this situation. 
First and Second Dawson Acts. 
The provisions of the First and Second Dawson Acts 
are set out and may be compared in the quotation which 
follows. In this quotation, words which were included in 
the First Dawson Act of April 22, 1954, but which were 
omitted in the Second Dawson Act of July 11, 1956, are 
bracketed. Words which appeared in the Second Dawson 
Act but not in the First Dawson Act are underscored. 
"(d) (1) Notwithstanding subsection (c), th~ 
fact that there is outstanding on any num.bere~ 
[mineral] school section, whether or not IDl~ 
. th . f "t y a mineral in character, at e time o i s surve --
. b h U . ted States, lease or leases entered mto y t e m th 
or an application therefor, shall not preven\ ~ 
grant of such numbered [mineral] school sec 10 
12 
to i lit' Sta tr concerned as provided [in] by this 
Ad. 
"(2) Any such numbered [mineral], school section 
which has heen surveyed prior to the date of [the 
enactment of this subsection] approval of this 
amendment, and which has not been granted to 
the· State concerned solely by reason of the fact 
that there was outstanding on it at the time of the 
snrVPy a mineral lease or leases entered into by 
the United States, or an application therefor, is 
hereby granted by the United States to such State 
under this section as if it had not been so leased; 
and the State shall succeed [to] the position of 
the United States as lessor under such lease or 
leases. 
"(3) Any such numbered [mineral] school sec--- ----
tion which is surveyed on or after the date of [the 
enactment of this subsection] approval of this 
amendment and on which there is outstanding at 
the time of such survey a mineral lease or leases 
entered iuto by the United States, shall (unless 
excluded from the provisions of this section by 
subsection ( c) for a reason other than the exist-
ence of an outstanding lease) be granted to the 
State conrerned immediately upon completion of 
such survey; and the State shall succeed to the po-
sition of the United States as lessor under such 
lease or leases. 
'' ( 4) The Secretary of the Interior shall, upon 
application hy a State, issue patents to the State 
fo.r the lands granted by this Act, in accordance 
with the Act of June 12, 1934 ( 48 Stat. 1185, 43 
U.S.C. 87la). Such patent shall, if the lease is then 
out standing, include a statement that the State 
13 
succeeded to the position of the United St t ., 
I t th t• h t• a €Ra' essor a e ime t e itle vested in the State. · 
'' ( 5) Where at the time rents, royalties, ana 
bonuses accrue [,] the lands or deposits coveredn, 
a single lease are owned in part by the State an·· 
in part by the United States, the rents royalti/ 
and bo~uses shall be allocated betwe~n them ~ 
proportion to the acreage in said lease owned 01 
each. · 
'' ( 6) As used in this subsection, 'lease' includei 
'permit' and 'lessor' includes 'grantor'." 
The First Dawson Act was, by its terms, limited in 
application to numbered ''mineral'' school sections. Witn 
the possible exception of Sections 2 and 32 of T. 40 S., 
R. 19 E., there is no evidence that any of the subjer! 
lands were known on July 11, 1956, or at any time prior 
to or subsequent to that time, to be mineral in character 
or known to be valuable for mineral (Finding VI, infra 
p. a-5). 
In the House Report (1956 U.S. Code, Congressional 
and Administrative News, Vol. 2, page 3111, 3112) ou 
the bill which became the Second Dawson Act, it is stated: 
'' It is the opinion of the Solicitor of the Depa:·(. 
ment of the Interior that the term 'numbered mm· 
eral section,' as used in the 1954 act, does not perd 
mit title to numbered school sections to be passe 
to the State where such lands are included inn~~­
competitive mineral leases or prospecting perilllbs 
· d to 1 unless they are subsequently determme 
mineral in character either as the result of pro· 
geo· duction therefrom or from land on the same 
f h · · 1 · ·n the known logical structure or o t eir me us1on I 
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geological structure of a producing field as de-
fined hy the Geological Survey. Thus, due to the 
technical defect referred to in the 1954 act, a State 
may obtain title to school section lands known to 
be ~aluable for minerals and included in mineral 
leases but may not obtain title to school-section 
lands included in mineral leases and not known to 
be valuable for minerals.'' 
Plaintiffs (Appl. Br. 8) state: 
'' There seems to be no question but that Con-
gress intenrled by this act (First Dawson Act) to 
include both mineral and non-mineral land.'' 
In sharp contrast the House Committee in the Report 
referred to above, stated: 
'' In short, while it may be argued from the com-
mittee and departmental report accompanying 
the bill which became the act of April 22, 1954, 
that the Congress intended that the broader grant 
(i. e., SC'hool sections known to be mineral in char-
acter and subject to a mineral lease) carry with it 
the lesser grant (i. e., school sections not known 
to be mineral in character but subject to a mineral 
lease or prospecting permit), the committee agrees 
that a plain reading of the existing law negates 
that intent." 
In an opinion of February 7, 1957 (M-36408), ad-
dressed to the Director of the Bureau of Land Manage-
ment by the Acting Associate Solicitor of the Depart-
ment of the Interior, it is stated: 
·' The grant made by the act of April 22, 1954 
( G8 Stat. 57) does not apply to any school section, 
the plat of survey of which was accepted on or after 
July 11, 1956. rrhe act of 1954 applies only to a 
15 
school section, surveyed before or after thf ~'~ 
which was known on the date of the accepta1tcf: nl 
the plat of survey thereof if prior to the ad 1,1 
July 11, 1956, supra, or on April 22, 1954, which. 
ever is the later date to be of mineral character 
and then only where a mineral lease solely pre. 
vented from attaching to the section, the grant ol 
mineral school sections made to a State by the ac1 
of January 25, 1927 ( 43 U.S.C. 870). The act of 
1954 applies only to such mineral school sections, 
because the act of January 25, 1927, supra, which 
it amends, applies only to mineral school sections 
excepting non-mineral school sections coming 
within the scope of the other amendatory act of 
July 11, 1956 (70 Stat. 529). As a non-competitive, 
non-producing oil and gas lease covering a schoul 
section not on the geologic structure of a produc-
ing oil or gas field, standing alone, is not sufficient 
to warrant a mineral classification of the section, 
the act of April 22, 1954, supra, does not apply to 
such a section unless the mineral indicationR m 
such as to justify classifying the section as mill· 
eral in character. Neither is any other kind of non· 
competitive, non-producing and non-preference 
right mineral lease, standing alone, sufficient to 
justify such a classification of a school section. The 
failure to include in the grant made by the act.oi 
1954 non-mineral school sections covered by mm· 
eral leases and to include mineral permits led to 
the passage of the act of July 11, 1956 (70 Stat. 
529)." 
It will be observed that both the First Dawson Act 
and the Second Dawson Act reiterate three times that 
where a mineral lease or leases entered into by the United 
States was outstanding at the time of attachment of Stalt> 
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,; 1J;· ·'the State shall succeed to the position of the United ''· -
:-;Lites under such lease or leases.'' 
Plnintiffs contend that the State did not succeed to 
the pot>ition of the United States as lessor, but, rather, 
succeeded to some other and different position. 
As lessor, the United States was obligated to recog-
nize the rights of the respective Defendants in this action 
tn extensions of their respective leases affected by this 
action. As lessor, the United States has fully recognized 
thai obligation in approving the extension requests and 
in receiving rents and approving assignments. So like-
wise has the State of Utah, in so far as it has succeeded 
to the position of the United States as lessor, given rec-
ognition to the rights of extension and to the extensions 
in accepting rents (R. 49) and approving assignments 
!R. 88-90) and in rejecting Plaintiffs' lease applications 
(R. 56-68). This is the crux of Plaintiffs' plaint. 
The Dawson Acts do not contain anything evidencing 
or even suggesting any intention of amending or altering 
any provision of the Mineral Leasing Act. The Dawson 
Acts do not purport to alter any terms of any existing 
lease or to abrogate any rights of the lessee under any 
existing lease. 
Srction 17 of the Mineral Leasing Act. 
~ection 17 of the Mineral Leasing Act as amended 
and In effect prior to September 2, 1960 ( 30 U. S. C. 226) 
mduded the following provisions: 
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" Upon the expiration of the initial five-\'( 
term of any noncompetitive lease maintaine;l i' 
accordance with applicable statutory requiremen:. 
and regulations, the record titleholder theren1 
shall be entitled to a single extension of the lea~e. 
unless then otherwise provided by law, for suf'n 
lands covered by it as are not on the expiratiuu 
date of the lease withdrawn from leasing uu<l~r 
this section ... No withdrawal shall be effecfat 
within the meaning of this section until ninety da1, 
after notice thereof shall be sent by regi~ter;11 
mail, to each lessee to be affected by such witl1. 
drawal. A noncompetitive lease, as to lands no! 
within the known geologic structures of a produr· 
ing oil or gas field, shall be extended for a perio1! 
of five years and so long thereafter as oil or g~~ 
is produced in paying quantities.'' 
These provisions were, by the Act of September ~, 
1960 (78 Stat. 781) continued in effect as to any oil auJ 
gas lease issued prior to that date (30 U. S. C. 
226-l(a) ). 
The basic premise of Plaintiffs, a premise rejecle1l 
by the trial court, is that a holder of a Federal oil anu 
gas lease which was issued prior to the acquisition of title 
by the State and which was outstanding at the time the 
State acquired title was, through the mere State acqID· 
sition of title, as to part of the leased lands, deprived as 
to such lands of the right to a 5-year extension under anil 
in accordance with the provisions of the Mineral Leasing 
Act. Such premise is contrary to the position taken b~ 
the Bureau of Land Management as evidenced hy it; 
approval of the extension requests (R. 69-86A) and by 
the Bureau of Land Management letter and decisions se: 
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forth at pages 179 through 189 of the Record in this 
.. se The Plaintiffs' premise is also contrary to the (,\U . 
position taken by the Utah State Land Board (R. 56-68) 
and by the Attorney General of the State of Utah 
( R. 191-194) ; and is further evidenced by the position 
taken by the State Land Board in this action (R. 7-9). 
B. THE UNITED STATES IS AN INDISPENSABLE 
PARTY TO THIS ACTION. 
The United States is not a party to this action and 
could not be made a party without its consent. Contrary 
to Plaintiffs' Point I contention, Defendants assert that 
the United States is an indispensable party. 
Monolith Portland Cement Compan.y v. Gillbergh, 
277 P. 2d 30, 34-36 (California, December 7, 1954) 
and cases cited therein. 
South Kamas Irrigation Company v. Provo River 
Water Users' Association, 10 U. 2d 225, 350 P. 2d 
851-853 (1960). 
Plaintiffs contend that in respect to the several sub-
ject Federal leases there could be no 5-year extension as 
Lo the included school section lands after State title 
attached thereto. As vital, then, to Plaintiffs' position 
as determination of whether State title attached to a par-
ticular tract is determination of when title attached. 
(1) Plaintiffs would have this Court require 
the State Land Board to act upon the 
premise that title to certain school sections 
passed f rorn the United States to the State 
of Utah at times different than the time 
when the Bureau of Land Management of 
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the Department of the Interior heir/ th 1 
title did pass. u 
As to 16 of the 37 Federal oil and gas leases affected 
by this action, the 5-year extensions were both requesh·d 
and were effective prior to the time (July 11, 1956) of \hp 
vesting of the State title to the school section lands in. 
eluded in such leases as such time has been determineJ 
by the Bureau of Land Management (Finding X, R. :50 
infra (p. a-8). 
If Plaintiffs concede (and Defendants find no such 
concession) that State title did not attach to the school 
sections affected by these 16 leases, then obviously the,1 
will have, to this extent, conceded themselves out of court. 
If, on the other hand, Plaintiffs contend that the Bureau 
of Land Management decisions as to when State title 
attached are incorrect and that State title attached at 
some other and earlier date, then it is thus apparent that 
Plaintiffs are asking this Court to determine, without 
the presence of the United States, that State title at-
tached at dates different to the date determined by thr 
Bureau of Land Management. Can it be reasonably urged 
that the United States would not be a necessary party to 
such a determination? 
The Federal government was entitled to all rentals 
which accrued prior to the date when State title at-
tached and the accounting between the State and Fed-
eral governments has, as to the State acquired lands, been 
based upon the attaching of State title on July 11, 1956 
(Finding IX, R. 32, infra p. a-7). If State title at-
20 
Lwhe<l earlier, the United States would owe to the State 
ct Utah and the State Land Board would have the duty 
to demand rentals accruing between the date of such at-
taeltment and July 11, 1956. Should any determination 
from which this result would follow be made in an action 
to whirh the United States is not a party? 
(2) Plaintiffs would have this Court require 
the State Land Board to act upon the 
premise that title to certain school sections 
passed from the United States to the State 
of Utah at specified times although there 
has berm no determination by the Bureau 
of Land Management as to whether or 
when State title attached. 
As to 7 of the 37 subject Federal leases there has 
been no decision by the Bureau of Land Management as 
to whether or when State title attached to any of the 
snbject lands included therein. Should this Court, in 
an action to which the United States is not a party, de-
termine whether and when title passed from the United 
States to the State~ 
(3) Plaintiffs would have this Court require 
the State Land Board to act upon the 
premise that certain lands are the property 
of the State although the records of the Bu-
reau of Land Management show that title 
thereto could not have passed to the State. 
As to 3 of the 37 subject Federal leases the State of 
Utah has never acquired title. The school section lands 
c·oi;ered by these 3 leases were included in Power Site Re-
sc•ne No. 42 prior to the time when State title would oth-
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erwise have attached. This Power Site Reserve ha~· rn·i• 
been revoked (Finding VII, R. 31, infra, p. a-r>J. ·\, '· 
another of the 37 subject Federal leases, mo acrP8 ot ti 
640 acres involved were included in Power Site Clas~; 
fl.cation No. 219 and was thus withdrawn before State titi-
would otherwise have attached (Finding VIII, R. 31·3~. 
infra, p. a-6). In one of the sections of subject laud (See 
tion 2, Township 40 South, Range 19 East), 61.48 acre~ 
are within Cigarette Springs Cave National l\ionumeut 
which was established before the section was suneyed. 
This 61.48-acre tract was even excluded from the snbjec! 
Federal lease SL-070497 which was issued as to this 
section. (Finding III, infra, p. a-2, R. 93.) 
If Plaintiffs concede that the State Land Board 
should not be required to "exercise jurisdiction" as to 
these withdrawn lands, they have not said so. 
( 4) The United States had a continuing inter 
est under a Federal lease entered into b.ii ii 
as to all lands covered by the lease not 
withstanding the fact that title to a por 
tion of the leased lands passed to the Stair 
subject to such lease. 
As to 37 of the subject Federal leases all but ?, 
(U-04257, U-05000-A and U-013636) embraced lands in 
addition to so-called ''school section lands'' (R. 69-Bi, 
Finding VIII, R. 32, infra, p. a-6). As to such additional 
Federal lands, Plaintiffs must concede that there is no 
possible basis for assertion of State acquisition. This sit· 
uation prevailed on and prior to July 11, 1956 and ou 
the dates when the Defendants assert their 5-year ex· 
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11 ,,iolls wPre effective and Plaintiffs claim they were 
11
<) 1 When the United States issued a Federal oil and 
,.~1 ~ Jease covering certain lands, that lease consisted .~. 
, 1f a single lease and that lease continued as a single lease 
;ii tli(~ time of the expiration of the original 5-year term 
aml at the time of the filing of a request for the 5-year ex-
tension expressly provided for under the above quoted 
Section 17 of the Mineral Leasing Act (30 U. S. C. 226). 
The lease did not cease to be a single lease merely because 
tlie United St ates, the lessor, transferred title to a por-
tion of the leasPd lands to the State of Utah. 
A lessor who has granted an oil and gas lease can-
not. h~· eonveying a portion of the leased lands to an-
otlwr, make two leases out of a single lease and thereby 
duninish thr lessee's rights or impose increased burdens 
upon the lessee. 
" Despite the statements to the contrary in 
Ntaudard Oil Co. v. Giller, and Cosden Oil Co. v. 
8carhorough, under the ordinary oil and gas lease, 
the lessee's duties under the implied covenants, as 
well as his liabilities under the drilling and term 
rlauses, are indivisible. The Lessee's duties of de-
,·elopment relate to the whole of the land leased, 
and not to separate units. Neither the lessor nor 
tlw lessee, merely by dividing his interest, can in 
an~· way change these duties into duties to devel-
?P p~rtirular portions of the demised premises as 
mdmrlual units.'' Summers: The Law of Oil and 
rras, Vol. 3, Chap. 16, sec. 516, p. 443. 
Any other rule would mean that the lessor by di-
'irling owne h. f 1 ' rs ip o t ie leased lands, could impose upon 
the lessee the necessity of having production from ca' .. 
of the divided portions in order to maintai11 the !i·a, 
beyond the stated or so-called primary term of tl1r Ji·a,. 
Any other rule would mean that the lessor, hy di\idi 11 ~ 
ownership of the leased lands, could impose upon tb 
lessee the necessity of off set drilling as between one por. 
tion of the lands covered by the lease and another po;. 
tion of the lands covered by this same lease. The court, 
have, of course, not countenanced any such a disregar:i 
of the rights of the lessee and obligations of the lessnr 
under their lease contract. 
It is clear from a reading of the First Dawson Act 
and of the Second Dawson Act that Congress contem-
plated that a lease would remain a single lease although 
the State acquired title to a portion of the leased lamb. 
Each of these Acts included the following provision: 
'' ( 5) Where, at the time rents, royalties, and 
bonuses accrue, the lands or deposits eoverc<l by 
a single lease are owned in part by the State and 
in part by the United States, the rents, royaltie.~. 
and bonuses shall be allocated between them rn 
proportion to the acreage in said lease owned by 
each.'' 
In discussing the effect of the Dawson Acts upou 
Federal oil and gas leases which included Federal lanJi 
as well as school section lands title to which vested in tln' 
State subsequent to the leasing, the Acting Director oi 
the Bureau of Land Management, in a letter dated ~[ay 
12, 1958, addressed to A. F. Barrett, President of the 
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Rocky Mountain Oil and Gas Association (R. 180-181) 
stated, inter alia: 
•' 'I1he regulations of 43 CFR, Parts 191 and 192 
will govern these oil and gas leases the same as 
before, including extensions, renewals, unitization, 
ei.r., notwithstanding their 'so-called' segregation 
for administrative purposes. That would not 
affect any rights in the leased lands held by vir-
tue of assignments or operating agreements .... 
'' Consi<lering the state lease as separate from 
the Federal lease will not create multiple drilling 
provisions. Production on either portion of the 
lease will operate to extend the lease in its entirety. 
Royalties on such production will be payable to 
the United States and to the State on the basis of 
the arreage in the lease owned by each, in the same 
manner as payment of annual rentals. The divi-
sion of income from these leases is discussed in 
an opinion by the Associate Solicitor dated July 
30, 1957 (M-36460),*' a copy of which is enclosed 
for your convenience. 
'' There is no authority in the law for segre-
gating any outstanding leases into two separate 
and distinct leases, one covering the Federal 
lands and the other covering the State lands." 
(Emphasis supplied.) 
Partieular attention is called to the Acting Director's 
Decision of July 16, 1959 (R. 182-183) involving Oil and 
Gas Lease Serial U-05660, which is one of the Federal oil 
and gas leases affected by this action. That Decision in-
cludes the following: 
" 'l'he Manager's decision is in accordance with th . . 
ese rnstructwns and the law; however, it may be --
*R. 187-189 
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~tated that the .lands are considered sq.;n•gatr, 
mto two categories for purposes of admini.stralun 
to aid in allocation of rents, royaltie8, and bonu~~, 
which accrue during the time the land8 or depositc 
owned in part by the State and in part by the lirnt-
ed States are covered by a single lease. It is onh 
when the lease terminates in any manner in it·~ 
entirety, or terminates or is assigned as to all of 
the State land, or as to all of the Federal land, that 
administration of it as a single lease under tlw 
provisions of subsection ( d) ( 5) of the act of .Juh 
11, 1956, supra, ceases. See Solicitor's Opinwi;, 
M-36460 (July 30, 1957). As to the impairment of 
contractual rights under the lease, including leasf' 
extensions, the Solicitor held in disenssiug the 
lessee's right of relinquishment that the act of 
April 22, 1954 (68 Stat. 57), as amended by the 
act of July 11, 1956 (70 Stat. 529) does not in m1>· 
way change the lessee's rights. M-36460 (.July 30, 
1957). It is incumbent upon the State to adminiR-
ter Federal leases which it is acquiring under thr 
Dawson Act, supra, on the basis of the contractual 
provisions of each lease and the rules and re1rula-
tions of the Secretary of the Interior, which form 
an integral part of the lease contract." (Empha~i­
supplied) 
In his Decision of September 1, 1959 (R. 184-1861 
affecting Oil and Gas Lease U-02510, the Acting Director 
of the BLM stated: 
'' * * * The 'so-called' segregation of the lrase is 
for administrative purposes only, and the regnl~­
tions contained in 43 CFR 191 and 192 will still 
govern such leases as to extensions, renewals, unit-
ization, drilling provisions, etc. Assignments_ of 
interests will be filed with tlw agency haYing JUl'-
isdiction over the lands being assigned. Prodnl'· 
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tioll on either portion of the lease will serve to 
extend tlw lease in its entirety. 
'• 'l1here is no statutory authority for the segre-
gation of the lPase into two separate distinct leases, 
ime covering the land owned by the State, the 
other covering the Federal land. The outstand-
ing lease will continue in full force and effect 
until terminated in any manner. Once the lease ter-
minates, the State may issue a separate and dis-
tinct lease for the land under its jurisdiction, and 
in arcordance with its own laws and regulations. 
" In a memorandum opinion, M-36460, dated 
.July 30, 1957, the Associate Solicitor of the Depart-
ment, in a construction of subsection ( d )( 5) of 
the Act of April 22, 1954, as amended supra, has 
determined that income from land embraced in 
such leases must be proportioned to the State and 
the United States on the basis of the acreage 
owned by each regardless of whether the lease is 
producing or non-producing and whether the pro-
ducing well is located in the State or in the Fed-
eral land in the lease.'' 
'l'he opinion addressed to Donald G. Prince, Land 
Examiner of the Utah State Land Board, under date of 
December 4, 1957, by the Assistant Attorney General of 
the State of Utah (R. 191-194) places the same interpre-
tation as does the Bureau of Land Management upon the 
Dawson Acts. 
Plaintiffs ask this Court to place upon the Dawson 
.\rts an interpretation at variance with the language of 
thest:> '\ets a d t h . . d ~ · ' n con rary to t e mterpretahon place 
thereon bv th t · · . a agency of the Federal government 
l'.harged with the administration of the public lands of 
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the United States, to the like interpretation placed therp. 
on by that agency of the State of Utah charged with th<· 
administration of its lands, and to the like interpretation 
of the trial court. Plaintiffs do not cite either any lan-
guage in the Dawson Acts or any authority whatsoever 
for the interpretation urged by them. 
Each of the Dawson Acts provided that when tlw 
State acquired title to a school section it would "succeed 
to the position of the United States as lessor" under any 
previously issued and then outstanding Federal lease 
or leases which affected that school section. These Acts 
provided that the State would succeed to "the position of 
the United States as lessor," not to some other and dif-
ferent position. How could the State be said to succee1l 
to the position of the United States as lessor under a lease 
if the State of Utah is to occupy any different position 
than the United States in respect to the obligation~ of 
the lessor or the rights of the lessee under the law, tl1i-
lease or the regulations? 
Each subject Federal lease which covered lands n 
part of which became State owned not only remained, a' 
do all of the leased lands, a single lease but the State "as 
entitled under the lease to share in any production from 
the lease whether that production be from the State-0"11ed 
portion of the leased lands or from the portion of tlie 
leased lands owned by the United States. It is eqnally 
clear that the United States was entitled under the lew•1' 
to share in any production from the lease whether tJiar 
production be from that portion of the leasecl prcnu~e~ 
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retained by the TJ nited States or from that portion of 
the leased premises which became State-owned. 
'i'his Court is asked by Plaintiffs to declare that the 
several subject ~,ederal leases were not extended as to 
!hat part of the leased lands which passed to the State. 
To so hold would be to declare that a single lease was to 
c;uffer amputation. rrhe United States would be a neces-
sary party in any action which directly or by indirection 
undertakes to determine its rights under a lease issued by 
it and under which it is entitled to participate in the pro-
duction from all of the leased lands, notwithstanding the 
fact that title to a portion of the leased lands may have 
passed to the State subject to the lease. 
The United States is an indispensable party to this 
action. 
C. THE RIGHT OF A DEFENDENT-LESSEE TO A 
5-YEAR EXTENSION OF HIS SUBJECT FEDERAL 
LEASE WAS NOT AFFECTED BY THE FACT THAT 
PRIOR TO THE EXPIRATION OF THE INITIAL 
5-YEAR TERM THE STATE ACQUIRED TITLE TO 
A PORTION OR ALL OF THE LANDS COVERED 
THEREBY. 
At:i io any subject lands title to which vested in the 
State, the State took title under the Dawson Acts subject 
to th · · ' c pnor ISsued Federal lease and succeeded to the 
position of the United States as lessor under such lease. 
"Tl .,. 18 posrnon of the United States as lessor" relates and 
must relate to the rights and obligations of the lessor and 
the ('Orres d' bl' . . pon mg o igat10ns and rights of the lessee 
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under the lease, the Mineral Leasing Act and the appli 
cable Mineral Leasing Act regulations. These rights and 
obligations find definition in the lease, the Mineral Lea~. 
ing Act and such regulations. Plaintiffs would have thii 
Court rewrite and redefine them. 
Each subject Federal lease expressly provided that 
the lease was issued : 
'' pursuant, and subject to the terms and pru-
visions of the Act of February 25, 1920 ( 41 Stat. 
437) as amended ... and to all reasonable regula 
tions of the Secretary of the Interior now or here-
after in force when not inconsistent with any ex-
pressed and specific provisions herein, which are 
made a part hereof." (Emphasis supplied.) 
The provisions of Section 17 of said Act relating to 5-year 
extensions have been hereinbefore quoted (supra p. 18). 
In Murphey v. McKay, 233 F. 2d 697, 698; C. A. D. C. 
1956, the court stated : 
'' Under the non-competitive lease provisions of 
the Mineral Leasing Act of 1920, as amended i1~ 
1946, 30 U. S. C. A. §226, the record titleholder ol 
a five-year oil and gas lease on public lands issue~ 
thereunder is entitled to a single extension thereol 
for a period of five years, provided he files an a~· 
plication therefor within 90 days before the expi· 
ration of the initial term.'' 
Plaintiffs state (Appl. Br. 11): 
. 1- ot' 
'' After title passes to the State, Section ' · 
the Mineral Leasing Act would not rontrul. Tlw 
controlling provision would be 30 U. S. C. A .. Ser· 
tion 189, ... '' 
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Plaintiffs do not and cannot cite any authority what-
rY<·r for that unfounded assumption. They merely quote 
;m lJ. s. C. A. Section 189 and, following such quotation, 
state: 
•' The provision just quoted covers Section 226 
authorizing the extension of leases unless other-
wise provided by law, and as stated in Section 
189 it has been otherwise provided by law in rela-
tion to the rights of states." 
Section 189 states no such thing and is not, Defendants 
submit, susceptible of such distortion. Section 189 was 
enacted as Section 32 of the Mineral Leasing Act twenty-
six years before the provision for 5-year extensions was 
first written into Section 17 of the Mineral Leasing Act 
by the Act of August 8, 1946 (60 Stat. 951) and thirty-
four years before the First Dawson Act was enacted. The 
first sentence of Section 189 authorizes the Secretary of 
the Interior to make rules and regulations to accomplish 
the purposes of the Mineral Lea.sing Act. The second and 
final sentence of Section 189, as enacted, appears as a pro-
viso reading : 
" Provided, That nothing in this Act shall be 
construed or held to a:ff ect the rights of the States 
or other local authority to exercise any rights 
which they may have, including the right to levy 
a~d collect taxes upon improvements, output of 
mmes, or other rights, property or assets of any 
lessee of the United States." 
In considering the purpose of that proviso, the Unit-
ed States Supreme Court, in Mid-Northern Oil Co. v. 
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Walker et al., 268 U. S. 45, 50; 45 S. Ct. 440, 441 (1'1~~11 . 
stated: 
'' No doubt what Congress immediately had iu 
mind was the necessity of making it clear that 
notwithstanding the interest of the government ir; 
the leased lands, the right of the states to tax 
improvements thereon and the output thmof 
should not be in doubt; but the intention likewi 8~ 
to save the authority of the states in respect to all 
other taxable things is made evident by the addi-
tion of the three general categories, 'other rights, 
property or assets.' We think the proviso plainly 
discloses the intention of Congress that person> 
and corporations contracting with the United 
States under the act, should not, for that reason, 
be exempt from any form of state taxation other-
wise lawful.'' 
If, as Plaintiffs urge, acquisition of State title served to 
obliterate the provisions of Section 17 relating to a 
5-year extension, it served to obliterate all other pr0Yi-
sions of said Section 17 relating to the rights anct 
obligations of the lessee and lessor. If such State 
acquisition of title served to obliterate Section li, 
it served to obliterate as well all provisions of erery 
section of the Mineral Leasing Act re la ting to rights 
or obligations under any prior issued Federal per-
mit or lease, whether such permit or lease were issued 
for oil and gas or for coal, phosphate, Rodium, potassium 
or oil shale. The Dawson Acts enable the State to stPp 
into the shoes of the United States as lessor hut they 
do not contemplate that such shoes can be used to walk 
away from the obligations which the lease, the law and 
the regulations imposed upon the United States ati le~s,ir. 
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'rlie significance and importance of this action ex-
t clld not only to the 37 subject Federal leases here in-
1 oh'e<l hut to other Federal leases in respect to which 
the State, after issuance, has acquired or may acquire 
title to all or a portion of the leased lands. They relate 
not only to oil and gas leases but to leases or permits for 
other Leasing Act minerals. They relate not only to the 
extension provision in said Section 17 but to the numer-
.1u8 other sections of the Mineral Leasing Act providing 
for extension of leases and permits under specified cir-
<·umstances and defining other statutory rights accorded 
to lessees or permittees under the Mineral Leasing Act. 
D. AN EXTRAORDINARY WRIT MAY NOT BE USED 
TO COMPEL THE UTAH STATE LAND BOARD TO 
REVERSE DECISIONS MADE IN THE EXERCISE 
OF ITS DISCRETION. 
Plaintiffs contend that the State Land Board should 
be disciplined by an extraordinary writ because the 
Board has allegedly ''failed and neglected to assume the 
management and control of said lands and have refused 
to act upon the applications of the respective plaintiffs 
as set forth above, except to deny the same." The stipu-
lated facts el early show that the State Land Board acted 
npou each of Plaintiffs' oil and gas lease applications 
and rejected them (R.. 56-68) - this for the reason that 
the State Land Board recognized and held that the lands 
applied for were subject to the prior issued and out-
~tanding leases of Defendants. The State Land Board 
further ha · d s exercise management and control as to all 
of the subject lands as to which State title has attached 
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by accepting rents (R. 49) and royalties paid unJr-i 11; 
oil and gas leases which had been issued by the Bureau 111 
Land Management prior to attachment of State title 
and has also clearly shown to have exercised manageme111 
by approving assignments (R. 88-90) which have bm 
filed as to 21 of the 37 outstanding leases affected by thi, 
action. 
That the State Land Board was not reluctant tu 
exercise jurisdiction and manage and control those sub-
ject lands which the State acquired is further evidencecl 
in its actions particularly referred to in Finding XIII 
(infra p. a-10) and in the stipulated facts (R. 195-19i) 
Refusal by the State Land Board to disregard the prior 
issued Federal lease to which State ownership was sub-
ject was not refusal to exercise jurisdiction. 
Plaintiffs actually seek, by asking for an extraordi-
nary writ, to have this Court review and reverse the ac-
tions of the State Land Board on Plaintiffs' several lease 
applications. In the case of Hathaway v. McConkie, s:i 
Utah 21; 38 P. 2d 300, the Supreme Court of Utah said: 
" ... It is well established that a writ of mandate 
may be used to compel an inferior tribunal to aet 
on a matter within its jurisdiction, but not to c~n­
trol its discretion while acting nor to reverse it~ 
judgment when made.'' 
Plaintiffs assume that the State Land Board wa~ 
required to issue leases to Plaintiffs. Sections 65-1-lS 
and 19, U. C. A. 1953, in effect at the time suit was fiiled. 
provided that the State Land Board may lease any por-
34 
·ion of the unleasrd lands of the State "for such royalty 
l , h . ·odurt as the board may deem fair and in the 
l!JlOll t C }Jl 
.' . t of 'he s~tate '' The State Land Board found that IJl(e!'PS S L ' " 
the lands covered by Plaintiffs' applications were not un-
i eased lauds as far as the oil and gas was concerned. 
Mandamus will not issue to compel performance of 
a discretionary act. Street v. Fourth Judicial District 
1'ourt, 113 Utah 60; 191 P. 2d 153. 
CONCLUSION 
The length of this Brief stands m recognized con-
trast to the brevity of the Brief of Appellants. In that 
brevity is to be found disregard of the differing facts 
and circumstances which relate to the 27 particular sec-
tions of land here involved and 37 particular subject 
Federal leases. Unsupported assertions require less 
space than reasoned and authority-supported refutations. 
The length of this Brief is dictated by Defendants' con-
cept of their duty of adequate presentation. 
When, as to any subject lands acquired under the 
Dawson Acts, the State succeeded to "the position of 
the United States as lessor" under any prior issued sub-
ject Federal lease, it did just what those Acts said, 
namely, succeeded to the position of the United States as 
les8or a- d t t 
u no o any other or different position whatso-
t1ver Tl · 
· le respective extensions of the subject Federal 
leases w I'd . · · ere va i and effective. When the State Land 
Board reJ'ected Pl . t'ff ' b' . . . am 1 s su Ject State applications, it 
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did the only thing it could do properly. It could not ~rup 
erly issue oil and gas leases on lands already subject to,,; 
and gas leases. As to those subject lands which the Statt 
acquired, the State Land Board's rejection of P!n 1 ~1 -
ti:ffs' applications was not only an exercise of managi·-
ment and control, it was a proper exercise of manageme111 
and control. 
Defendants (Respondents) respectfully submit tlrn1 
the Findings of Fact of the trial court are fully supported 
by the Record; that the Conclusions of the trial court 1m· 
correct and fully supported by the facts as found and 
by applicable law; that the judgment appealed from 
should be affirmed ; and that Respondents should ht 
awarded their costs incident to this appeal. 
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FINDINGS OF FACT 
I 
•' The respective Plaintiffs heretofore and in Novem-
ber and December, 1956, filed in the State Land Office of 
the State of Utah 21 • certain applications for mineral (oil 
and gas) leases (R. 46). Hereinafter in these Findings and 
Conclusions said applications are referred to as the 'sub-
ject State Applications' and the State of Utah is referred 
to as the 'State.' Exhibit "1" (R. 54-55) attached to the 
Stipulation of Facts filed herein sets forth, as to each 
subject State Application, the name of the applicant 
(plaintiff) by whom filed, the mineral lease application 
C\fLA) number assigned to said application by the State 
Laud Officei the date of filing of said Application in the 
f;rate I .and Office and the description of the lands covered 
by said application. The lands covered by said 21 subject 
State applications are hereinafter in these Findings of 
Fad and Conclusions of Law collectively referred to as 
the 'subject lands.' The subject lands involve all or por-
tions of 27 different so-called 'school sections,' ( i. e. Sec-
tions 2, 16~ 32 and 36) in 12 townships. 
* MLA 
6989 7004 15010 15047 
6990 7005 15037 15056 6991 7006 15044 15062 7001 7007 15045 15063 7002 7033 15046 15066 7003 
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II 
Each of Plaintiffs is now and at th(~ time nl ti. 
'Jj\ 
' ' 
filing of the subject State Applications filed by mL 
Plaintiff and at all intervening times was a <'itizeH of 1Ji 1 
United States, qualified to file applications for oil and ga, 
leases from and to take oil and gas leases from the Stale. 
Each subject State Application was filed on the form ill!'; 
in the manner prescribed by the State Land Boaro oi 
Utah for the filing of applications for oil and gas leas~.' 
from the State (R. 47). 
III 
" Prior to the time that the State aequired titl1• tr: 
any of the subject lands, 37 United States Oil and G:;' 
leases• (R. 48, 6.9-87) had been issued by the Bmean ol 
Land Management of the Department of the Interior 
(hereinafter referred to as "BL1\'1' ') under the i\linernl 
Leasing Act of February 25, 1920, as amernled 1::i: 
U. S. C. 181 ff) hereinafter referred to as thl' '~li1wn1l 
Leasing Act,' covering (among other lands) all of thl' 








































• '[ 1() I..' R t '.J K which was on February 11, 1916, tll'll ..!., • -:t u., . ' 
. 1 .· . t'i tlie surYey thereof included within Cigarette ~!Iii ]llJOl ' L 
.... · ., •'a\'e Natio11al Monument as a result of a Presi-:-:;1a111g~ ,, · 
di·ntial Proclamation of that date, and which remains so 
inel Di kd ( U. 48, 8.'i, .9.1). These 37 United States oil and 
}r:i.- ll·ase'< are hereinafter ref erred to as the 'subject 
F.·deral leases.' F.ixhibit "A" (R. 69-86a) attached to the 
'°T1p11!<:d ioTI of Fads filed herein sets forth as to each 
, 11 bject Federal lease (R. 48-49) the name of the lessee, 
the dat!:' of the lease, the date of the filing of a request for a 
:-;_,ear cxtern,io11, the date of the approval of such request, 
thr dcsrription of any Section 2, 16, 32 or 36 lands cov-
tTed thereby, reference to the conflicting subject State 
:ipplicati(ln, the date of approval of the Plat of Survey of 
t!:1: particular township involved, and the withdrawals, 
if any, which had been made affecting the particular sub-
jPl't lands involved. As to each of the 37 subject Federal 
leases a request or application for a 5-year extension of 
the initial 5-year term of the lease (hereinafter referred 
ti; a::; a '5-year exte11sion request') has been filed with and 
lia" been approved by the BLM (R. 93-161). As to 
~ 1 l'-Ofi7::3o and U-07312) of the subject Federal leases, 
1
i1t· initial fl-year term of the lease expired subsequent to 
llie tiliu!! of the subject State applications (R. 86a, 156, 
"? .. /.)"<), As to the remainder of the subject Federal 
](·uses the · · f I -
· nu ia u-year term of the lease expired prior 
tothc>filing f tl l' ' . . 
· 
0 ie su i.wct State apphcat10ns. 
IV 
'' The State Land Board of Utah rejected each of tn: 
21 subject State applications and by several letters, eac!: 
dated January 20, 1958, advised the applicant that thf 
application had, on January 6, 1958, in some instances, 
and on January 7, 1958, in the remaining instances, at 0 
regular meeting of the State Land Board, been rejerted 
as to the subject lands which were covered by such appJi. 
cation; that the subject lands covered by the applieatioL 
were included in oil and gas leases issued by the United 
States (R. 56-68); and that the Attorney General of tLr 
State, in an opinion dated December 4, 1957 (R. 191-194). 
had ruled that the respective 5-year extensions of tim 
granted by the United States on those respective lease, 
issued by the United States were valid and should be rec 
ognized by the State. 
v 
" By Executive Order of July 2, 1910, part of th1• 
subject lands, to-wit: Sections 2 and 32 of T. 40 S., K 
19 E., S. L. M., were withdrawn and reserved as pan 
of Petroleum Reserve No. 7 (R. 47). By Public Land 
Order No. 1160 of June 6, 1955, said Executive Order oi 
July 2, 1910, which had been made prior to the appro\'al 
of the plat of survey of said township on March 28, 19e. 
was revoked as to said Sections 2 and 32. Prior to sai:i 
Public Land Order of June 6, 1955, subject Federal lease' 
SL-070497, U-02661, U-04637 and U -06730, had beei. 
issued. Said subject Federal leases SL-070497, U-02661. 
U-04637 and U -06730 embraced (among other lands) sai,; 
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<", [IPll ;~2 and that portion of said Section 2 which is not 
11 jthiu Cigarette Springs Cave National Monument 
1R 47-48). 
Prior to the acceptance or approval by the BLM 
of the several plats of the United States surveys cover-
iHg the subject lands other than the above mentioned 
St'etions 2 and 32, the remaining 33 subject Federal leases 
whirh had been issued embrace (among other lands) all 
of such subject lands, other than said Sections 2 and 32 
(R. 48). 
VI 
With the possible exception of Sections 2 and 32 of 
1'. 40 S., R. 30 E., • there is no evidence that any of the 
subject lands were known on July 11, 1956, or at any 
time prior to or subsequent to that time, to be mineral in 
character or known to be valuable for mineral. 
VII 
All of Section 36, T. 27 S., R. 17112 E. (being a por-
tion of the lands covered by subject Federal lease U-05153 
- R. 77) and the W. % of Section 32, T. 27 S., R. 18 E. 
(being a portion of the lands covered by subject Federal 
lea1;e U-04320 - R. 78) and all of Section 2, T. 28 S., 
~· 17% E. (being a portion of the lands covered by sub-
.wet Federal leases U-05152 - R. 70 and U-05153 -
R. 77 ) were included within Power Site Reserve No. 42 
of July 2 1910 . . ' , pr10r to approval of the respective Plats --
' "R. 30 ~·"should read "R. 19 E." 
See Stipulation of Facts par. 4 (R. 47). 
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of Survey of said townships and remam so incluut: 
(R. 87). The SW 14 of Section 36, T. 39 S., R. 21 K,wa. 
included in Power Site Classification No. 219, eff Prtiy, 
February 26, 1929, prior to the approval of the plat 
11 
survey of said section and remains so included (R. 8u: 
VIII 
" As to one (U-04320) of the 37 subject Feder~;· 
leases, the BLM has held that State title has nerer ;· 
tached to any of the leased lands covered thereby li; 
reason of pre-survey inclusion within Power Site Rt·· 
serve No. 42 (R. 114). As to 7 (U-02661, U-045:J~. 
U-04637, U-05152, U-05153, U-06730, U-07312) of thd; 
subject Federal leases, there had been no decision by the 
BLM as to whether or when State title attached to any 
of the subject lands covered thereby (R. 91-92, 97, 12!1-W. 
127-128, 146-148, 149-150, 156-157, 158-160). Each of 
these 7 leases covered Federal lands in addition to thP 
subject lands covered thereby (R. 85, 72, 78, ; 11 , 
77, 86a, 82). 
'' As to the remaining 29 of the 37 subject Fcdera: 
leases, the BLM has rendered decisions holding that State 
title attached to all or part of the subject lands co\'ereil 
by said respective leases on a specified date (R. 91-92))» 
to one (SL-070497-R. 85, 91, 94) of these 29 leat:Jes, title 
was held to have attached June 6, 1955, (the date of P. L 
0. No. 1160) to that portion of the subject lands corerf:! 
thereby, this by reason of the Act of April 22, 1954, (tiS 
Stat. 57) commonly ref erred to as the 'First Dawson 
•lll 
Act.' As to another ( U-04688-A R. 80) of these ·' 
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1
,·;to:•>. :-ital!• title was held by BLM decision to have 
irt;idll'd ,July 11, 1956 (the date of the Act of July 11, 
l'.J.)ti, (/0 Stai. 529; 43 U.S. C. 870), commonly referred 
'C• a~ tlw 'Seeond Dawson Act') as to 480 acres of the 
ti-HJ ar·res of imbject lands covered thereby and to have 
111
.\ er att11che<l to the remaining 160 acres by reason of 
prl'-~urwy inclusion within Power Site Classification No. 
:!10 (R. so, 14U). As to the remaining 27 of these 29 leases, 
L~,c !11 all of the suLject lands covered thereby was held 
10 han_. nttached July 11, 1956, under the Second Dawson 
Ad (R. 91-92). 
Of the above referred to 29 leases all but 3 
(U-04257, U-05000-A, U-013637) at the times when the re-
~pcctive 5-ycar extension requests were filed, when State 
title attaehed to the subject lands covered by the respec-
ti\·e leases, and when the respective BLM decisions were 
issued recognizing the extensions, embraced lands in 
addition to those whieh became State lands (R. 69-86a). 
IX 
·· As to ~mbject Federal lease SL-070497, the account-
ing of rentals as between the United States and the State 
was ha~:ed upon the vesting of State title to the included 
sdwo! sedioll lands on June 6, 1955. As to subject Fed-
l'ral h'ase tT-04688-A, such accounting was based upon 
111 l' \·i:sting of State title to 480 acres of the 640 acres of 
uiclndC'd school section lands on July 11 1956 the date 
' ' 
of thl· Sel'ond Dawson Act (R. 49, 50, 91, 92). As to sub-
.i"f't F'erlnal lease U-04320, the BLM held that State title 
did iwt vest as to any of the leased lands (R. 87, 91, 114). 
a-7 
As to subject Federal leases U-02661, U -04532, l'-04C. 
U-05152, U-05153, U-06730 and U-07312, it appears tla 
there has been no BLM decision as to whether or wh,, 
State title attached to any of the leased lands and cor~, 
quently there has been no accounting between the Unit. 
States and the State with respect thereto (R. 91-92, y; 
123-124, 127-128, 146-148, 149-150, 156-157, 158-161! 
As to the remaining 27 subject Federal leases, the a, 
counting between the United States and the State ofllta: 
as to rentals paid to the United States thereunder La• 
been based upon the attaching of State title to the Hrhor 
section lands on July 11, 1956 (R. 49-50, 91-92). 
x 
" As to one (U-04320) of the subject Federal leasi·,, 
the BLM decision of May 6, 1958, held that State tit\, 
did not attach to any of the leased lands - this by reasor 
of pre-survey inclusion of the school section lands witln: 
Power Site Reserve No. 42 (R. 87, 91, 114). As to 2 oth1·1 
(U-05152 and U-05153 - R. 70, 146-148, 77, 149-15U, F; 
of the subject Federal leases, the same preclusion of at 
tachment of State title is shown by the evidence to exist 
'' As to each of 16* of the subject Federal leases, the 
5-year extension request had been filed and the requrste,i 
extension was effective prior to the time (July 11, 1956) ni 
the vesting of State title to a portion of the leasrd Ian,[, 
as thereafter determined in the applicahle RLM del'isiiii 
* Lease Record 
SL-071028 ________ 74 
U-04106 ............ 70 
U-04107 ............ 69 
U-04108 ............ 76 
U-04257 ____________ 71 















U-04399 . ··· ... ~ 
U-04408 .. ··· 
U-04409 .. · 74 
8.3 U-04417 - 73 U-04533 
:\~ to Ntch of 9• of the subject Federal leases the 
-,_yrar extension request had been filed with the Bureau 
ul: Lalld l\Ianagement prior to the date when, according 
to later decisions of the Bureau of Land Management, 
the State acquired title to any of the leased land. 
As to only 4 (SL-070497, U-05000-A, U-05660, 
l1-05G61) of the subject Federal leases with respect to 
1r!tich a BLM decision holds State title to have attached 
tu the included subject lands, the 5-year extension re-
quest was filed with the BLM after the date of the vesting 
of State title as set forth in such decision (R. 85, 77, 86, 
91-!12). 
" In each instance, where there has been a .BLM de-
('ision holding State title to have vested as to part or all 
nf the leased lauds, the 5-year extension requested was 
fill'd with and was approved by the BLM prior to the de-
cision so holding and prior to any notification to the 
lt:ii::;ee under the subject Federal lease or to the State in 
respert to such attaching of State title (R. 69-86a, 93-161). 
XI 
" Rach subject Federal oil and gas lease expressly 
proYides (R. 16'2-178) that the lease was issued: 
'· · . . pursuant, and subject to the terms and pro-
viHions of the Act of February 25, 1920 ( 41 Stat. 
4.:37) as amended .... and to all reasonable regula-
tions of the Secretary of the Interior now or here-
• Lease Record Lease Record Lease Record 
tu1 ·-0404667896 ·.·.·.·.·.· .·.·_· .. 7809 tr a -04684 ............ 79 U-04685 ............ 7 
U.04922 ...... :75 
U-04687 ............ 83 U-04688-A ........ 80 
U-04925 ............ 75 U-013637 .......... 72 
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after in force wh<>n not inconsistt>nt with ;1 11 ,, . 
pressed and specific provisions hen•iJl, whidi ;i 
made a part hereof.' 
XII 
'' Each of the subject Federal leases was a noneoni. 
petitive lease and, at the expiration of the initial :1-Yt'li' 
term thereof, had been maintained in accordanrl' 1, !'. 
applicable statutory requirements and regnlatii:i> 
(R. 49). There is no evidence that any of the suhjP1' 
lands or other lands embraced within any subject lea,, 
were within the known geologic structure of a prodnm: 
oil or gas field at the time of the expiration of thr ini1i::' 
5-year term thereof or at any time prior or snhseqm1· 
thereto. There is no evidence that any of the suhject la11d, 
or other lands embraced within any subject F'e<lernl lea» 
have been included within any withdrawal from lca,ln~ 
at or prior to the expiration of the initial 5-year t 1~rn 
thereof. As to each of the subject Federal lease~, th 
5-year extension request was filed in the Utah Land Ofli"' 
of the BLM by the record title holder of the leasr withi 1 
a period of 90 days prior to the expiration of the ini1ia' 
5-year term thereof. As to each subject Federal leasi. 
such 5-year extension request was approved by the BU! 
as to all of the lands coYered thereby prior to any no1ii· 
by the BLM to the lessee or to the State that 8tnt1' titr, 
had attached to any of the leased lands. (R. 69-8Go). 
XIII 
" The State Land Board of Utah has not rl'fll!•l'1l '· 
exercise jurisdiction as to those of tlH' subjert laud~ tit 
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, 1 ··Ii Ji·is IH'l'll ;H·1 111irPd by the State. The stipulated :Jt \, lll ( 
:;
1
,,. ,J 111 w tli:it the State Land Board, in several in-
-t:irH't'"· 11 11dcrtook, as to some of the subject lands, to 
,•\•·rcise jurisdiet io11 prematurely. In three instances, it 
iPi•krto;.k, l1don· thP e11actme11t of the First Dawson 
nill, to grant minl'ral knses on lands which were then 
1
!1' 1 :11 t l1P t irn<' of suney sn hject to prior issued and out-
..:1 :iiili n~ F1•deral Jens<>s (H 195, items I (1), II (1) and 
, : 1 :. 111 '.2:2 iJl:-;lnw·<>s, it undertook to grant leases (R. 
/'1i, 1/f'111 . .; I (1) anrl (2), II (1) through (6), Ill 
tl) tl1ru11,qh (.1) (5) (fi) and (8) through (16)) prior to 
th(· tinw (.Jnly 11, 1956) when the Bureau of Land Man-
:lg'l'lll01lt held titl<> to have attached to the affected State 
lands ( R. 1.1J1 192). Subsequent to the vesting of title 
in :he Statv, the State Land Board has exercised juris-
dietio11 in collecti11g rents and in approving assignments 
011 ~11rh of thrse prematurely issued leases as were not 
"arlier canccll<>u. In 2 instances, the State Land Board 
l:ai' issued metalliferous minerals leases since State title 
\'l'.-;t0d ( n. 196, 197a, items Ill ( 4) and (7) ). The State 
Laud Board ha:;; exercised jurisdiction in rejecting Plain-
tiff'R appli('ations, in receiving and accepting rentals as 
io thr Rtate lands covered by subject Federal oil and gas 
lrase:; and in approving assignments as to 21 of the sub-
.il'<'t Pcderal oil nnd gas leases in so far as such assign-
Illl·nt" •·nn:red lands, title to which had been acquired by 
tliP Statr nnder thP First Dawson Bill or Second Dawson 
Bill (R. HB-.'10)." 
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